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A B S T R A C T
Current evidence describing antimicrobial resistance (AMR) in the context of the Syrian conflict is of poor
quality and sparse in nature. This paper explores and reports the major drivers of AMR that were present
in Syria pre-conflict and those that have emerged since its onset in March 2011. Drivers that existed
before the conflict included a lack of enforcement of existing legislation to regulate over-the-counter
antibiotics and notification of communicable diseases. This contributed to a number of drivers of AMR
after the onset of conflict, and these were also compounded by the exodus of trained staff, the increase in
overcrowding and unsanitary conditions, the increase in injuries, and economic sanctions limiting the
availability of required laboratory medical materials and equipment. Addressing AMR in this context
requires pragmatic, multifaceted action at the local, regional, and international levels to detect and
manage potentially high rates of multidrug-resistant infections. Priorities are (1) the development of a
competent surveillance system for hospital-acquired infections, (2) antimicrobial stewardship, and (3)
the creation of cost-effective and implementable infection control policies. However, it is only by
addressing the conflict and immediate cessation of the targeting of health facilities that the rehabilitation
of the health system, which is key to addressing AMR in this context, can progress.
© 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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Multilateral action by international health bodies and govern-
ments is required to combat the global threat of antimicrobial
resistance (AMR). Failing to address issues at the local level can
have regional and global implications. The fallout of the Syrian
conflict is not restricted to Syria and neighbouring countries: in
2015 alone, 378 000 Syrians entered Europe – roughly one-third of
the 1.3 million refugees seeking asylum there (Connor, 2015). The
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) and
the World Health Organization (WHO) have stated that the risk of
infections resulting from the living conditions that refugees
encounter are greater than the risks of them importing infections
(WHO, 2017; Brusin et al., 2015; European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, 2016). Nevertheless, potentially high rates
of AMR amongst Syrians require us to address the causes, risks,
costs, and future considerations of this challenge both for Syrians
living in conflict and for Syrian refugees.
The Lancet Series on the promotion of universal access and
sustainable effectiveness of antimicrobials in the context of AMR
includes policy recommendations for national and regional
interventions to combat resistance (Dar et al., 2016). These include
infection prevention and control (IPC), surveillance, monitoring,
stewardship, and the strengthening of health systems. It highlights
the importance of access to effective antimicrobials whilst also
ensuring effective stewardship and vaccination as a means of
addressing AMR globally. For Syria and other conflict-affected
countries to participate in the WHO Global Action Plan (GAP) on
AMR, a pragmatic focus on what can be achieved in these countries
is required. This is particularly the case in Syria where a
comprehensive national action plan to address AMR is currentlyPre-confli ct
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This article identifies the drivers of AMR that existed before the
conflict and those that have occurred since the onset of conflict in
March 2011. It also makes recommendations as to how these can be
addressed.
Drivers of AMR in the Syrian context
This section examines the potential drivers of AMR in Syria
before and after the onset of conflict, highlighting those most
relevant to the Syrian context. Figure 1 summarizes the main
drivers and their consequences.
Drivers of AMR in the Syrian context: pre-2011
Prior to the conflict, health indices for Syria, a middle-income
country, showed many parallels with those of Western countries,
such as completion of the epidemiological transition and a life-
expectancy in excess of 70 years. In contrast to Western countries,
neither microbiology nor infectious diseases were recognized as
speciality areas of training, nor were they financially rewarding.
Little training was provided beyond medical school; there were
few opportunities for continuing medical education. The labora-
tories established in public hospitals under the Ministry of Health
(MoH) and Ministry of Higher Education were variably equipped
with manual (Kirby–Bauer) and automated (Phoenix and Vitek)
AMR testing. IPC was inadequate, with poor implementation of the
National Protocol for Infection Control, and protocols for universal
precautions were absent. Efforts towards antimicrobial steward-
ship are seen in the legislation drawn up by the Syrian SyndicateConfli ct related or exacer bated by the c onfli ct
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antibiotics, passed in 1994 (Syrian Syndicate for Pharmacists,
1994). This effort to regulate OTC availability of antibiotics was not
enforced by the government.
The notification of communicable disease was legislated by the
Syrian Arab Republic in 2007 (Decree No. 7, 2007) (Anon, 2018) and
surveillance guidelines were issued by the MoH in 2010 for both
public and private sectors. However, as with the regulation of
antibiotic sales, this legislation was not enforced. Reporting tended
to be done on an ad hoc basis, usually without laboratory
confirmation.
Nosocomial infections were poorly reported, but frequently
described anecdotally. Well before the onset of the conflict,
Acinetobacter was reported to be the most common cause of
ventilator-acquired pneumonia across intensive care units in
public hospitals of Damascus (personal communications with
Syrian microbiologists, surgeons, and internal medicine special-
ists). Notably, nosocomial or community-acquired infections with
Acinetobacter beyond the respiratory system were rarely or not
described prior to 2012, which marked the first use of heavy and
explosive weaponry.
Consistent with this context, there is evidence to support high
population rates of antimicrobial usage, poorknowledge of drivers of
AMR, little regulation in the distribution and OTC sale of antibiotics,
and excessive self-medication. In 2007, Barah and Goncalves
conducted a cross-sectional study exploring citizens’ usage,
knowledge, and attitudes towards antimicrobials in the Kalamoon
region of Syria (Teicher et al., 2014). Four hundred and thirty
households were sampled randomly and 366 (85%) responders
reported using antimicrobials in the preceding 4 weeks, with only
43% of these courses being prescribed by a healthcare professional
(Barah et al., 2009). This is mirrored by other studies that
demonstrated high use and readily available OTC supplies of
antibiotics; these potentially contributed to selective pressure
leading to AMR (Al-Faham et al., 2011). Antibiotics purchased OTC
included amoxicillin–clavulanate, amoxicillin, cefadroxil, clarithro-
mycin, and azithromycin (Al-Faham et al., 2011).
In healthcare, antibiotic stewardship programmes were poor,
with over-prescribing amongst doctors driven by patient expect-
ations. Data on compliance with the prescribed antibiotic course or
the quality of antibiotics produced are not available. The paucity of
surveillance data inside Syria is consistent with the lack of a
systematic process through which laboratories report results to
track AMR. Challenges relating to this include a health system pre-
conflict that was increasingly privatized, with a growing number of
private laboratory facilities or public–private partnerships with
little standardization (Teicher et al., 2014). Developing a robust
surveillance system for AMR in line with the WHO Global AMR
Surveillance System (GLASS) is important although challenging
during conflict (Fleming Fund, 2016).
Neglect of water chlorination and sanitation services in certain
areas is evidenced by cholera outbreaks that occurred in 2008 and
2009 in Deir Ezzor and Ar-Raqqa (Anon, 2015). Furthermore, there
was dissonance in the rates of vaccination against routine
childhood diseases reported by official agencies and the surveil-
lance agencies used by the WHO and the United Nations Children’s
Emergency Fund (UNICEF): in 2008, the MoH reported national
coverage rates of 98–99% (Qamishli and Bab, 2004), compared with
76.3–82% recorded by the Syrian Commission for Family Affairs in
the 2008 population survey (Syrian Center for Policy Research
SCPR, 2016).
Drivers of AMR in the Syrian context: after the onset of conflict
Multiple drivers of AMR since the onset and expansion of the
conflict are identifiable: the crowded and unsanitary livingconditions due to forced displacement, the neglect and destruction
of public healthcare, and insecurity caused by war compromising
access to healthcare. Concerning human resources, thousands of
professional and allied healthcare workers, including laboratory
technicians, have left the country, voluntarily or involuntarily, in
both government and non-government areas. Reasons include
physical and financial insecurity, the military draft, the incarcera-
tion and execution of medical personnel, and targeted assaults on
clinics and hospitals. This has left a gap of trained staff competent
in the diagnosis and management of infections, particularly those
caused by resistant organisms (Fouad et al., 2017).
The collection and processing of samples is also affected by the
gaps in training and education. Remaining residents and nursing
staff are untrained in the collection of samples, which may lead to
contamination at collection. Contamination of samples may also
occur on receipt of the samples by untrained laboratory staff in
public hospitals. Both manual tests (Kirby–Bauer) and automated
tests are dependent on skilled processing of samples to produce
reliable results. The shortage of laboratories and paucity of
adequate quality control in the processing of samples impedes
surveillance and appropriate diagnosis. Inadequate culture and
sensitivity testing and the unreliability of results will lead to over-
treatment compared to antibiotic therapy guided by laboratory
reports. This practice is exacerbated both by the lack of skilled
microbiologists to provide guidance to clinicians, as well as the lack
of experienced clinicians to interpret laboratory results without
guidance from microbiologists. No reliable quality control testing
of locally made antibiotics is available; hence vancomycin is the
only antibiotic that can be tested for active ingredients.
The degree to which AMR exists amongst patients is unknown.
Monitoring of compliance is compromised by the difficulty posed to
patients in presenting to hospitals and primary health centres, given
the insecurity and violence. The absence of standardized syndromic
guidelines may exacerbate the clinical tendency towards usage of
available broad-spectrum antibiotics for prolonged periods of time,
as indicatedby the preferential purchaseofcarbapenems and fourth-
generation cephalosporins (WHO EMRO, 2016).
Onward transmission of resistant organisms is exacerbated by
the overcrowding resulting from forced displacement and the lack
of adequate water supplies and sanitation. Safe water levels are
less than half of pre-war levels (International Committee of the Red
Cross, 2015). With the progression of the conflict, the capacity of
health centres to sterilize medical instruments generally and
surgical instruments specifically has become weaker due to a lack
of disinfectants and required consumables. Chlorine, the primary
agent for decontaminating water and widely used in sterilization
and disinfection, has faced stricter regulation following its use as a
chemical weapon. The overuse of metronidazole in response to an
escalation of water-borne diseases causing gastroenteritis has led
to widespread clinical concerns about resistance. As metronidazole
no longer appears to be effective in triple therapy for Helicobacter
pylori, it has necessitated substitution, in turn dependent on the
availability of clarithromycin.
Economic sanctions have restricted the availability of medical
materials and equipment. Spare parts for autoclaves and other
disinfection equipment are not available. There is only one certified
microbiologist in Syria (US board-certified), and only five
physicians with experience in microbiology could be located
across the country. There are very few laboratory engineers
capable of maintaining existing equipment. New brands imported
by UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations
in Damascus may follow tendering protocols, but are rarely
familiar to hospital engineers. Irregular electricity and internet
supplies are a consistent concern across the country, compounding
this issue of sterilization. Obtaining the necessary security
approvals for transportation of medicines is time-consuming.
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areas, one example being the systematic removal of antibiotics
from convoys to besieged or recently besieged areas. In May 2017,
paediatric antibiotics were removed from a WHO convoy to
Madaya (Anon, 2016).
Economic sanctions also negatively affect the supply of reagents
for AMR testing, from agar plates and discs for manual Kirby–Bauer
tests, to software updates for the Phoenix automated machines to
include newer antibiotics such as ticarcillin. This increases the
challenges of accurate diagnosis and management of infections.
The restrictions on importation of high quality foreign manufac-
tured medicines have exacerbated this issue: in 2016, the Syrian
MoH and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs banned the import of all
medicines that could be purchased locally. As a result, the quality
control previously ensured by international agencies such as the
WHO, UNICEF, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), and the International Committee for the Red Cross in
procuring medications under strict quality assurance is now lost.
Obtaining the necessary security approvals for transportation is
time-consuming, taking up to 4 to 6 months. This fuels the
smuggling of imported and expensive medicines from Lebanon,
pushes up the price of already scarce drugs on the market, and
increases the dependency on smuggled drugs. In consequence,
impoverished Syrians are dependent on locally manufactured
medicines of poor quality.
In areas outside of government control such as Idlib – a
governorate bordering Turkey, adjacent to Aleppo, and housing
some 2.5 million Syrians, many internally displaced – there is
widespread distrust of drugs sent from Damascus. However, the
difficulty and delay in arranging legitimate cross-border convoys
drives the smuggling of fake antibiotics. An example of this is the
availability of fake spiramycin, an antiparasitic used to treat
toxoplasmosis in pregnancy, which was supplied to Idlib in 2015.
As a consequence, in 2016 the Directorate of Health in Idlib set up a
quality control laboratory to ensure quality assurance of medi-
cines, and in the near future, antimicrobial resistance.
Alongside challenges resulting from the damaged health
system, the war trauma produced by the heavy weaponry used
in this conflict has led to an exponential increase in the number of
infection-prone high-risk injuries such as contaminated open
wounds and fractures. After three decades of peace following the
previous government’s repression of the popular uprising in 1982,
surgeons and other healthcare workers lacked the training and
experience required to deal with war trauma. Early in the conflict,
the inappropriate use of internal fixators in open or contaminated
wounds and surgery by untrained staff may have contributed to an
increased risk of deep bone infections and infected prostheses,
further exacerbated by the lack of supportive diagnostic facilities
to allow optimal diagnosis and management. In besieged areas like
Eastern Ghouta, homemade external fixators have been used due
to denial of surgical supplies.
The nature of weaponry contributes to the range of wounds and
the degree of contamination. The conventional weapons in use can
result in a range of injuries including open wounds, fractures,
amputations, and brain or spinal cord injuries, which may be
contaminated at the time of injury or subsequently in the course of
treatment (Eardley et al., 2011). Barrel bombs containing shrapnel,
nails, and explosives such as TNT are commonly used in Syria,
causing catastrophic damage. Acute lung injury is common after
the inhalation of dust, with subsequent requirement for intubation
and the attendant risk of ventilator-associated pneumonia (Alsadat
et al., 2010). The use of antibiotics in these instances, particularly
for prolonged periods and without guiding microbiology, add to
the selective pressures driving AMR. There have also been
suggestions that the heavy metals present in weaponry contribute
to AMR (Hobman and Crossman, 2015).As the conflict has progressed, not only have there been fewer
functioning health facilities, but patients have been unable to
access medical care due to insecurity, poverty, or fear. This may
have contributed to self-prescribing with inappropriate or
incomplete courses of antibiotics, worsening what was already a
social norm prior to the outbreak of the conflict (Hamzeh et al.,
2012). In addition, the diminishing supply of clean water and
antiseptics, and the lack of access to wound care and facilities in
which debridement can occur, has contributed to infection and
poor bone or soft tissue healing. The use of long-term catheters in
patients with spinal cord injuries or impaired mobility will
promote susceptibility to infections with the subsequent use or
inappropriate use of antibiotics, further increasing the risk of AMR
(Al-Assil et al., 2013).
Hospitals are a key place where AMR strains develop and
flourish under normal conditions. In non-government controlled
areas in Syria, these conditions are worsened: hospitals are being
built in basements or even purpose-built several floors under-
ground to avoid targeting, they are dark and often damp, there is an
absence of natural sunlight and ventilation, and there is a lack of
sterilization equipment and adequate disinfection materials.
In addition to these factors, the large-scale population move-
ments resulting from the conflict may also have contributed to
human-to-human transmission and the potential spread of
resistant organisms through air travel (Holmes et al., 2015). Of
considerable concern is Gaziantep, just 50 km from the Syrian
border, home to half a million of Turkey’s three million refugees,
and a major site of international medical tourism. This has been
seen at other sites of medical tourism such as New Delhi (Kaul and
Chhina, 2010), but the potential for superbugs to be introduced and
spread within these vulnerable populations of refugees and
surgical frequent flyers is a unique and grave concern.
How can this be addressed?
Tackling AMR amongst Syrians inside Syria and those seeking
refuge in neighbouring countries or Europe requires multifaceted
action at the local, regional, and international levels. Addressing
the conflict in Syria as a political facet is key. The immediate
cessation of the targeting of healthcare facilities, cease-fires, and a
solution to the civil war are urgently needed to reduce the burden
of injured and allow the return of healthcare workers and the
rehabilitation of the health system. In addition, we call on the WHO
to adhere to their GAP on AMR, launched at the World Health
Assembly in 2015, addressing antibiotic stewardship, infection
prevention and control, and access to appropriate therapy (Anon,
2017). Others have advocated for a One Health approach to tackle
AMR given the widespread use of antibiotics in agriculture, with
the threat to global food security compounded by climate change.
Notwithstanding the importance of the WHO GAP and the
imperative for a One Health approach, there is an obvious need for
pragmatic, actionable recommendations in Syria and other
settings of conflict and insecurity. Table 1 sets out the key
recommendations and discusses the challenges faced in the Syrian
context. These include measures to support the mapping of
microbiology facilities inside Syria, participation in surveillance
amongst healthcare facilities, capacity-building through the
training of staff, and ensuring the availability of equipment and
consumables. The regulation of OTC antibiotic availability, while
critical to responsible antibiotic stewardship, is dependent on the
government for enforcement of the existing legislation and is
demonstrably unsuccessful in this context. Similarly, the control of
diseases with epidemic and pan-epidemic potential depends on
excellent surveillance, sample collection, quality assured labora-
tory testing, and reporting by the Member State in adherence to the
International Health Guidelines. A programme of education for
Table 1
Recommendations for tackling antimicrobial resistance inside Syria and in facilities treating Syrian refugees.
Recommendation Action needed to achieve core measure Primary organizations responsible
Surveillance On-call service at laboratories for weekends and holidays; improved monitoring
services




Easing sanctions for drugs and equipment; the Ministry of Health must lift the ban on
imported medicines





Improve access to training courses, updates, and modules; either remotely with
telemedicine or as short courses in neighbouring countries
Reduce the gap in trained medical laboratory specialists and technicians
WHO, international and regional medical, public
health, and allied health academic institutions and
organizations
Ensure learning Utilize the One Health approach in future research; continue to build the evidence
base for action on issues of AMR; additional retrospective studies should be conducted
in Turkey









Improve the collection and reporting of local data in hospitals that are unable to report
on AMR broadly, and specifically in the ICU, surgical ward, or maternal ward, etc.;
guide clinical practice of doing cultures for testing; widespread training of residents
and nurses to avoid contamination in laboratory testing; leading to specific treatment
and informing syndromic guidelines
AMR, antimicrobial resistance; ICU, intensive care unit; UN, United Nations; WHO, World Health Organization.
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practice and cultural expectations is unlikely to be successful
under the current conditions. It is clear, however, that this problem
must be addressed urgently; this urgency is underscored by the
relatively new initiative – the Syrian Association for Infectious
Diseases. Investing in basic, cost-effective microbiology services in
hospitals and centralized regional microbiology references to act
as referral centres should allow cost-effective processing of
samples as well as potential for training of staff and improved
quality control measures. There is also the opportunity for
innovation including the use of rapid diagnostic tests to identify
particular bacteria or for increased public–private partnerships as
was often the case before the war.
Despite the paucity of robust evidence to support it, a concern
that refugees may transmit infections including AMR organisms to
local populations prevails (Angeletti et al., 2016). A full review of
AMR amongst refugees and migrants in Europe has been addressed
elsewhere (Heudorf et al., 2016). The ECDC has issued a rapid risk
assessment on communicable diseases in general (Brusin et al.,
2015) and on carbapenem-resistant Enterobacteriaceae (CRE)
(European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, 2016), with
recommendations that focus on infection control and the adequate
capacity of microbiology laboratories with prompt notification of
clinical teams. A recommendation for screening and pre-emptive
contact precautions and isolation of patients considered at high
risk of CRE carriage is recommended (European Centre for Disease
Prevention and Control, 2016). However, it remains vital for each
country hosting refugees to assess the AMR access and stewardship
needs of refugee communities within its borders through the
International Health Regulations Joint External Evaluation Tool
process (which can support their health security plans) and
harmonize it with the roll-out of their AMR national action plans
(World Health Organization, 2005).
Conclusions
The conditions created by the conflict in Syria both exacerbate
existing drivers and create powerful new drivers of AMR. The
unique challenges presented by the growing threat of AMR in
conflict require a pragmatic, multi-faceted approach to detect and
manage the potentially high rates of multidrug-resistant infec-
tions. Such an approach must be tailored to the current status of
the health system(s) in Syria, with the priorities being (1) the
development of a competent surveillance system for hospital-acquired infections, (2) antimicrobial stewardship, and (3) the
creation of cost-effective and implementable infection control
policies. Hospitals are a key place where AMR strains develop and
flourish, particularly in Syria. Accordingly, effective infection
prevention and control procedures could play a major role in
decreasing the occurrence of outbreaks of infections and in
limiting the opportunities for aggressive bacterial strains to
acquire new resistance genes. Innovative approaches could include
strategies to build patient resistance, such as targeted immuniza-
tion with measles or BCG vaccine to boost immunity.
Building the capacity for clinical laboratory diagnosis and
optimizing the management of patients with communicable
diseases will increase the ability of local medical facilities in Syria
to make fast and precise diagnosis of transmissible infections,
provide targeted antibiotic treatment, minimize the spread of
antibiotic-resistant strains, and limit the occurrence of large
outbreaks of infections. This is vital given the internal population
movements and the movements of refugees both in countries
neighbouring Syria and internationally.
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